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Abstract 
In Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, L.W. Sumner defends two significant 
constraints on one’s theory of welfare: formality and generality. An adequate 
theory of welfare, claims Sumner, must give a constitutive account of the “good-for”
relation.  This constitutive account must be sufficiently general that any entity 
whose status as a welfare subject is uncontroversial falls within its scope. This 
paper will argue that Sumner’s proposed constraints are particularly significant to
utilitarian arguments for the equal moral considerability of non-human animals.  
In the absence of these constraints, the inconsistency that is alleged to follow from 
denying moral considerability to non-human animals, while affirming it for 
humans, fails to obtain.  I will focus on Peter Singer’s argument for the equal moral
considerability of non-human animals, in order to support the conclusion that 
questions about the formality and generality of welfare are significant areas of
further research for philosophers of animal welfare. 
Introduction: Welfare and Animal Ethics 
Welfare is about how well an individual is faring, relative to the 
circumstances of their life.  Well-being and prudential value are both 
synonymous with welfare, such that talk about an individual’s well-
being, or the prudential value of some aspect of their lives, is taken to 
be about their welfare.  There are many different accounts of what 
welfare is, but all largely agree that welfare concerns how individuals 
are faring, and that welfare matters for ethics.  Thus, questions about 
animal welfare are properly questions about how non-human animals
are faring, and what sorts of things would make their lives better for 
them. 
In Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, L.W. Sumner proposes two 
requirements for an adequate theory of welfare.  One of these is the 
requirement of generality. This requirement states that an adequate 
theory of welfare should accommodate the wide variety of types of
welfare subjects to which our welfare vocabulary is applied (Sumner 
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1996, 14). This is a controversial suggestion, since we speak similarly 
about the well-being of other humans, non-human mammals, 
mollusks, houseplants, and even automobiles.  Sumner claims that 
this controversy can be addressed by distinguishing between the core 
welfare subjects and the periphery.  Whereas there is bound to be 
disagreement about whether fringe entities are truly welfare subjects, 
an adequate theory of welfare would have to at least account for 
beings about which there is no such disagreement (Sumner 1996, 15).
 Another requirement proposed by Sumner is the requirement of 
formality. Sumner’s proposal here is that a theory of welfare must do 
more than simply offer a list of the sources of welfare.  Rather, a 
theory of welfare must provide a constitutive account of the good-for 
relation (Sumner 1996, 17).  While adequate food, access to clean 
water, affordable medical care, and a decent education might all be 
important for a person’s well-being, this doesn’t explain why all of 
these things belong on this list.  A theory of welfare must explain 
what is common to the variety of sources of welfare, even across 
species lines, which qualify them as sources of welfare.  Sumner notes
that this amounts to a “unitary theory of welfare,” whereby the good-
for relation is taken to hold across relata (Sumner 1996, 17).  In what 
follows, I will also refer to Sumner’s formality requirement by 
reference to the notion that welfare is unitary.
     The formality and generality of welfare are proposed by 
Sumner as constraints that are intended to guide inquiry into the 
nature of welfare, but these requirements have also played a 
prominent role in utilitarian arguments for the equal moral 
considerability of non-human animals.  Peter Singer, Bernard Rollin, 
and R.G. Frey are among the proponents of such arguments (Singer 
1975, Rollin 2006, Frey 1983).  Though Rollin and Frey disagree with 
Singer on a number of key points, they all agree that there is a 
fundamental inconsistency in denying moral considerability to non-
human animals while granting it to human beings.  Their arguments 
have been successful because they highlight something that seems 
obvious, but is often taken for granted in our daily lives.  If humans 
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fare better to the extent that their pain is minimized and their 
pleasure is maximized, why think non-human animals are any 
different? Perhaps the most successful of these types of arguments is 
Peter Singer’s argument that denying equal moral considerability to 
non-human animals is a form of prejudice that he dubs 
“speciesism” (Singer 1975).  Singer’s argument contends that it is the 
capacity for suffering which is the sufficient condition for having 
interests, and that all beings that have interests are due equal moral 
consideration (Singer 1975, 2-9). Since non-human animals have the 
capacity for suffering, non-human animals are therefore due the 
same moral consideration that humans receive.  It is only in virtue of 
species-specific prejudice that humans neglect to extend due moral 
consideration to non-human animals.  Singer rightly concludes that 
speciesism, like racism and sexism, are unjustifiable forms of
discrimination. 
Singer’s argument, though compelling, rests on two assumptions 
that reflect Sumner’s constraints: that welfare is a unitary concept 
and that a theory of welfare must be general.  Singer’s argument 
assumes that welfare amounts to the same thing for humans and non 
-human animals.  This paper will first explain the role that these two 
assumptions play in Singer’s argument, and then demonstrate that 
the inconsistency that is alleged to follow from denying the moral 
considerability of non-human animals is avoidable if one either 
rejects the generality requirement or denies that welfare is unitary.  
Both of Sumner’s requirements may be appropriate constraints on a 
theory of welfare, but in the absence of convincing arguments to this 
effect, they are nothing more than undefended assumptions that are 
crucial to the success of utilitarian arguments for the equal moral 
considerability of non-human animals.  These considerations thus 
represent an important area for further philosophical research on 
welfare in general, and animal welfare in particular. 
Welfare and the Moral Considerability of Humans 
In Animal Liberation, Peter Singer offers a utilitarian 
argument for the equal moral considerability of non-human animals 
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(Singer 1975, 2-9).  It is important to specify the sense in which this 
argument is a utilitarian one. After all, Singer is not here advocating 
that the morally best action is the one which leads to the greatest 
aggregate amount of happiness (though Singer sometimes speaks this
way about both human and animal welfare).  Rather, Singer’s 
argument for the moral considerability of non-human animals 
emphasizes the utilitarian commitment to the unique moral 
significance of welfare (Sumner 1996, 186).  Singer’s argument, 
though he utilizes the language of pleasures, pains, and interests, is 
properly an argument from the moral significance of welfare.  The 
form of Singer’s argument from Animal Liberation, as applied to the 
human case, is the following: 
1. If humans can experience pleasure and pain, then humans have 
interests. 
2. Humans can experience pleasure and pain. 
3. Therefore, humans have interests. 
4. If humans have interests, then humans are due moral 
consideration. 
5. Therefore, humans are due moral consideration(Singer 1975, 5-8). 
Singer concludes that it would be inconsistent to accept this 
argument but reject the same argument concerning non-human 
animals. But before we assess this claim, let’s consider whether this 
argument is sound as it stands.  
The above formulation of Singer’s argument suggests that being 
able to experience pleasure and pain is a sufficient condition for 
having interests, and that having interests is sufficient for moral 
considerability. But why think the fourth premise, that having 
interests is sufficient for being morally considerable, is true?  
Depending on how we formulate the notion of having an interest, 
entities that are not obviously morally considerably might qualify as 
having interests. For example, if organisms have an interest in 
whatever keeps them alive, then plants have interests.  Corporations 
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clearly have interests, but they are not obviously due equal moral 
consideration in virtue of this. 
The first premise might be thought to eliminate this possibility, 
since plants and corporations lack the capacity for pleasure and pain. 
But the first premise is a conditional statement establishing pleasure
and pain as a sufficient condition for having interests.  It is perfectly 
consistent to accept the first premise while rejecting the fourth, on 
the grounds that while the capacity for pleasure and pain is sufficient 
for having interests, having interests is not sufficient for moral 
considerability. The worry here is simply that we need some reason 
to think that having interests is sufficient for being morally 
considerable, both generally and because some entities that have
interests do not seem to be morally considerable. 
This concern can be avoided by revealing an implicit premise
which connects having interests to being a welfare subject, and then 
inferring moral considerability from the fact that one is a welfare 
subject. Such a strategy is consistent with the utilitarian commitment 
to welfare as the sole source of intrinsic value.  The modified version 
of Singer’s argument is as follows: 
1a. If humans can experience pleasure and pain, then humans have 
interests. 
2a. Humans can experience pleasure and pain. 
3a. Therefore, humans have interests. 
4a. If humans have interests, then humans are welfare subjects. 
5a. Therefore, humans are welfare subjects. 
6a. If humans are welfare subjects, then humans are due moral 
consideration. 
7a. Therefore humans are due moral consideration. 
This argument commits Singer to the satisfaction of interests as a 
constituent of the good-for, since it makes having interests sufficient 
for being a welfare subject. However, it does not commit him to an 
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interest-satisfaction theory of welfare, wherein the good-for relation 
is specified solely in terms of the satisfaction of a subject’s interests.  
In the next section, I will argue that Singer’s commitment to the 
claim that it would be inconsistent to affirm the moral considerability 
of human beings while denying equal moral consideration to non-
human animals does commit him to a unitary theory of welfare, 
where interest-satisfaction is a constituent of the good-for relation  
for both humans and non-human animals. 
Inferring the Moral Considerability of Non-Human 
Animals 
So far, I have argued that in order to infer the moral 
considerability of humans from the fact that they have interests, 
Singer must appeal to interest-satisfaction as a constituent of welfare.
Next, I will present Singer’s argument for the moral considerability of
non-human animals and demonstrate the role of the formality and 
generality of welfare in arguments of this sort.  Below is Singer’s 
argument for the moral considerability of non-human animals, along 
with my proposed amendment revealing Singer’s implicit premise. 
1b. If non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain, then 
non-human animals have interests. 
2b. Non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain. 
3b. Therefore, non-human animals have interests. 
4b. If non-human animals have interests, then non-human animals 
are welfare subjects. 
5b. Therefore, non-human animals are welfare subjects. 
6b. If non-human animals are welfare subjects, then non-human 
animals are due moral consideration. 
7b. Therefore, non-human animals are due moral consideration. 
As in the human case, moral considerability follows from being a 
welfare subject, rather than simply having interests or being capable
of pleasure and pain. And like the argument for the moral 
considerability of humans, this argument also depends on interest-
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satisfaction being constitutive of the good-for relation, whether 
partially or completely. It is tempting to think that interests need 
only be partially constitutive of the good-for relation for Singer’s 
argument to be sound in both cases, and that the additional 
constituents of welfare can differ according to subject type.  By 
considering the general form of Singer’s argument, it becomes clear 
why this is not the case. 
1c. If X can experience pleasure and pain, then X has interests.
 
2c. X can experience pleasure and pain.
 
3c. Therefore, X has interests. 

4c. If X has interests, then X is a welfare subject.
 
5c. Therefore, X is a welfare subject.
 
6c. If X is a welfare subject, then X is due moral consideration.
 
7c. Therefore, X is due moral consideration.
 
For this to be a valid argument, being a welfare subject must mean 
the same thing whatever object is substituted for X.  As I discussed in 
the first section of this paper, being a welfare subject involves being 
the sort of creature for whom things can go better or worse.  If the 
way in which things go better or worse for a human being is 
constitutively different from the way that things go better or worse 
for non-human animals, then being a welfare subject does not mean 
the same thing for both humans and non-human animals.  Thus, for 
the general form of Singer’s argument to be valid, welfare must be a 
unitary concept. The good-for relation must be constitutively 
identical, otherwise Singer’s argument equivocates on the term 
“welfare.” Either the good-for relation must be specified solely in 
terms of interest-satisfaction, or the additional constituents of the 
good-for relation must be the same for humans and non-human 
animals. 
This is not a problem for Singer’s argument, but it is a necessary 
concession for the form of his argument to be valid.  If Singer defends
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a single account of the good-for relation that includes interest-
satisfaction as a constituent, then both humans and non-human 
animals qualify as welfare subjects in virtue of having interests, 
because “welfare” refers to the same thing throughout Singer’s 
argument. To deny the moral considerability of non-human animals 
while affirming it for humans then would be inconsistent, because 
non-human animals clearly meet the sufficient condition for being 
welfare subjects, and therefore qualify for moral consideration. A 
unitary theory of welfare does commit one to the conclusion that non 
-human animals are due equal moral consideration, as Singer claims. 
That this is a desirable outcome for one’s theory of welfare is 
supported by Sumner’s generality requirement, which says that an 
adequate theory of welfare must capture the core class of welfare 
subjects within its scope. 
Avoiding Inconsistency: Two Strategies 
Despite the seemingly positive resolution of some initial 
concerns with Singer’s argument, there is reason to think that his 
argument remains susceptible to serious challenges. In this section, I
will offer two strategies for avoiding the inconsistency charge that 
makes Singer’s argument so effective.  The goal of this section is to 
demonstrate that both the generality and formality requirements 
proposed by Sumner are necessary for Singer’s inconsistency charges 
to stick. In the absence of either requirement, one can easily explain 
why there is no inconsistency in accepting the moral considerability
of human beings while failing to grant equal moral consideration to 
non-human animals. 
Solution #1: Reject the Generality Requirement 
Suppose one were to accept the unity of welfare, but deny the 
generality requirement, as well as denying that welfare is even
partially constituted by interest satisfaction.  One might instead hold, 
for example, that welfare is constituted by the satisfaction of a 
subject’s desires (Sumner 1996, 113-137).  This allows one to accept
Singer’s argument in the human case, but reject it in the animal case. 
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To illustrate this, let’s examine both arguments, along with the truth-
value assignments that would reflect this position. 
1d. If humans have desires that can be satisfied, humans are welfare
subjects. - T 
2d. Humans have desires that can be satisfied. - T 
3d. Therefore, humans are welfare subjects. - T 
4d. If humans are welfare subjects, then humans are due moral 
consideration. - T 
5d. Therefore, humans are due moral consideration. - T 
1b. If non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain, then 
non-human animals have interests. - T 
2b. Non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain. - T 
3b. Therefore, non-human animals have interests. - T 
4b. If non-human animals have interests, then non-human animals 
are welfare subjects. - F 
5b. Therefore, non-human animals are welfare subjects. - F 
6b. If non-human animals are welfare subjects, then non-human 
animals are due moral consideration. - T 
7b. Therefore, non-human animals are due moral consideration. - F 
This position does not involve the implausible claim that non-human 
animals can’t feel pleasure and pain.  Nor does it reject the 
conditional in premise 6b, which affirms that being a welfare subject 
is the relevant characteristic for moral considerability.  But it does 
allow one to reject the inconsistency charge.  If the satisfaction of our 
desires is sufficient for being a welfare subject, as stated in premise 
1d, and the good-for relation is a single relation that holds across 
relata, as the formality requirement maintains, then the fact that non 
-human animals have interests is not directly relevant to whether 
they have a welfare, because interest satisfaction is not a constituent 
of welfare on this view. And if one rejects the generality requirement,
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which says that an adequate theory of welfare should reflect the scope
of our welfare language, then the fact that non-human animals turn 
out not to be welfare subjects on this view is not a deficiency for one’s
theory of welfare. Rejecting generality, while affirming that welfare is
unitary, allows one to defend a single constitutive account of welfare 
that is not applicable to non-human animals.  This might be an 
implausible view of welfare, but implausibility is not inconsistency. A
desire-satisfaction theory of welfare, where welfare is unitary but not 
general, allows one to consistently affirm the moral considerability of 
humans while denying equal moral consideration to non-human 
animals. 
Solution #2: Deny that Welfare is a Unitary Concept 
Avoiding Singer’s inconsistency charge by adopting a unitary, 
desire-satisfaction theory of welfare while rejecting the generality 
requirement, though effective, might seem somewhat disingenuous.  
After all, Singer’s point is properly that if one accepts that having
interests is sufficient for being a welfare subject, thereby granting 
moral considerability to any being with interests, it would then be 
inconsistent not to grant moral considerability to non-human 
animals. The first proposed solution relies heavily on the rejection 
interest-satifaction as a constituent of welfare. But suppose one were 
to accept that interest-satisfaction is a constituent of welfare in the 
human case.  Also, suppose one were to affirm the generality 
requirement, maintaining that a theory of welfare must reflect our 
ordinary welfare talk and capture the core class of welfare subjects 
within its scope. Finally, suppose that one denies the unity of 
welfare. This opens up the possibility of multiple, distinct accounts of 
welfare, where the constituents of welfare are not the same. 
This position might seem immediately attractive, since it 
recognizes that an adequate theory of welfare minimally ought to 
reflect the least controversial ways that we use welfare language while
allowing that the constituents of welfare might be dependent on the 
type of welfare subject.  This view also captures the common sense 
proposal that human well-being is importantly connected to interest-
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satisfaction. However, it doesn’t establish the inconsistency that 
Singer’s argument is dependent on.  This is demonstrated by the two 
arguments below. 
1a. If humans can experience pleasure and pain, then humans have 
interests. - T 
2a. Humans can experience pleasure and pain. - T 
3a. Therefore, humans have interests. - T 
4a. If humans have interests, then humans are welfare subjects. - T 
5a. Therefore, humans are welfare subjects. - T 
6a. If humans are welfare subjects, then humans are due moral 
consideration. - T 
7a. Therefore humans are due moral consideration. - T 
1b. If non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain, then 
non-human animals have interests. - T 
2b. Non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain. - T 
3b. Therefore, non-human animals have interests. - T 
4b. If non-human animals have interests, then non-human animals 
are welfare subjects. - ? 
5b. Therefore, non-human animals are welfare subjects. - ? 
6b. If non-human animals are welfare subjects, then non-human 
animals are due moral consideration. - T 
7b. Therefore, non-human animals are due moral consideration. - ? 
Again, the implausible claim that non-human animals can’t feel 
pleasure and pain is avoided, and the conditional in 6b is affirmed.  
But if one rejects that welfare is a unitary concept, the fact that 
interest-satisfaction is constitutive of human welfare doesn’t tell you 
anything about non-human animal welfare.  By denying the unity of 
welfare, it is an open question whether “welfare” means the same 
thing for both humans and non-human animals.  If one rejects the 
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unity of welfare, one must be prepared to defend a separate account 
of the good-for relation for each type of welfare subject.  It might 
even turn out that interest-satisfaction is constitutive of welfare for 
both humans and non-human animals.  The point is just that one 
cannot infer this from the fact that interest-satisfaction is a 
constituent of human welfare unless one maintains that welfare is a 
unitary concept. If welfare is not unitary, the soundness of the first 
argument leaves premise 4b, and thus 5b and 7b, with indeterminate 
truth-values. It is not inconsistent to accept the first argument but 
fail to affirm the conclusion of the second in this case, because 
whether this conclusion is true or false depends on what account of 
non-human animal welfare turns out to be true.  Without the 
requirement that welfare is a unitary concept, this question remains 
open.
     One might think that the generality requirement resolves this 
concern. After all, the generality requirement says that a theory of 
welfare must capture the core class of welfare subjects within its 
scope, and surely humans and most non-human animals fall equally 
into this category. But the generality requirement does not entail the 
unity of welfare. One might hold an interest-satisfaction theory of 
welfare for humans and a natural-living-based theory of welfare for 
non-human animals, with additional accounts of welfare included as 
needed to capture the core class of welfare subjects.  One’s theory of 
welfare would then effectively be a disjunction of several distinct, 
subject-specific accounts of the good-for relation.  The generality of 
welfare requires only that one’s theory of welfare capture the core 
class of welfare subjects; it does not require that one posit a single 
good-for relation in order to accomplish this task.  Even if one 
accepts an interest-satisfaction theory of welfare for humans, along 
with the generality requirement, if one rejects that welfare is unitary, 
there is no inconsistency in affirming the moral considerability of 
humans while failing to grant equal moral consideration to non-
human animals. One can simply remain agnostic about whether non-
human animals are morally considerable, and one’s theoretical 
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commitments about welfare explain why such agnosticism is 
appropriate. 
Conclusion 
Sumner’s proposed constraints on a theory of welfare are 
significant because they make our ordinary linguistic practices a kind 
of litmus test for the theoretical accuracy of proposed accounts of well 
-being.  There is ample reason to welcome this proposal.  Human well 
-being concerns how our lives are going for us, from our own point of 
view, and one might think that what we have to say about the matter 
is therefore highly relevant.  Sumner’s constraints also capture some
of our more compelling intuitions about welfare:  that the good-for
relation is one type of relation, and that things can be genuinely good 
for a wide range of distinct types of subjects.  Sumner’s proposed 
constraints have the attractive features of linguistic compatibility and
intuitive plausibility. 
This paper has sought to show that there are other reasons to 
think Sumner’s proposed constraints on a theory of welfare are 
significant, and worth further attention.  Utilitarian arguments like 
that of Peter Singer continue to be some of the more compelling 
arguments for the equal moral considerability of non-human 
animals.  These arguments unquestionably rely on both the generality 
and formality requirements for their success.  If one rejects the 
generality of welfare, one can avoid the alleged inconsistency of 
denying the moral considerability of non-human animals while 
affirming it for humans by simply adopting a theory of welfare that 
does not capture non-human animals within its scope.  If one rejects 
that welfare is unitary, one can accept Singer’s argument that the 
moral considerability of humans ultimately depends on the fact that 
they have interests that can be satisfied or thwarted , but remain 
agnostic about whether non-human animals are morally 
considerable. This also avoids the alleged inconsistency.  Utilitarian 
arguments for the moral considerability of non-human animals are 
thus importantly dependent on the unity of welfare and the generality 
requirement. If utilitarian arguments of this sort are to have a future,
  
 
97
these constraints on a theory of welfare must be given more support 
than they have received thus far.
     In closing, none of what has been said here demonstrates that 
utilitarian arguments like Singer’s cannot succeed.  It might be that 
welfare is a unitary concept, and that the generality requirement is a 
perfectly reasonable constraint on one’s theory of welfare.  But such 
constraints are not vindicated by their intuitive plausibility or their 
theoretical usefulness. Questions about the unity and generality of 
welfare thus remain significant areas for further research on welfare 
in general, and animal welfare in particular.  
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